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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Petitioners (hereinafter referred to as "Employers") have presented two questions for Review: 
" 1. Whether this Court should review this case of first impression in order to establish 
the proper legal standard for evaluating the compensability of injuries which occur in 
a "work-at-home" circumstance. 
2. Whether the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously sanctions an 
unreasonably broad legal standard when compared with the majority opinion in the 
United States and the standard espoused by Professor Larsen."1 
Charles Tjas (hereinafter the "Employee") submits that Petition should be denied for failure 
to demonstrate any "special" or "important" reasons why it should be granted. Rather, it seeks to 
have this Court create an exception to existing workers compensation law to bar compensation, solely 
because an injury occurred at home, although the employee was otherwise entitled to compensation 
under existing Utah law, an exception which would be contrary to the clear statutory directive.2 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeals, authored by the Hon. Michael J. Wilkins, 
Employers' Petition at 1. 
2Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1997). 
held that the Commission did not err in awarding compensation, under the facts of this case: 
"Under the facts of this case, we agree with the Commission that Mr. Tjas's injury 
arose from a risk associated with his work for Ae Clevite due to the parties' 'work 
at home' arrangement. *** As a general proposition, the Workers' Compensation 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401 (1997), applies to 'work at home' situations when 
a person sustains an injury by an accident 'arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment. Moreover, we hold that under these facts, Mr. Tjas's injury 
at his home falls within the category of compensability under section 34Ar2-401 
because it was an injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment.3 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion in this matter on February 10,2000. Petitioner's 
filed their Petition seeking a writ of certiorari on March 13, 2000. The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §78-2-2 (3) (1) (1999). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1997) provides the basic statutory outline for compensability 
of injuries to employees, as follows: 
"(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident 
was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: [benefits] * * *" (emphasis added) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case concerns a dispute over whether the Labor Commission, under the specific facts of 
this case, must be found to have abused its discretion, to have overstepped "the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality" in its determination that Mr. Tjas was engaged in an activity incidental 
to his employment at the time of his injuries. While the case involves issues regarding a "work-at-
home" situation which has not been previously addressed, it does not involve any issue of "first 
'AE Clevite v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App. 035, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22. 
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impression" since the determinative statute, as reflected above, provides that Utah's workers' 
compensation provisions apply "wherever such injury occurred." Thus, this case presented issues 
which, as the Commission and the Court of Appeals determined, had previously been addressed, 
albeit with regard to injuries at other locations. 
Employers denied Employee's application for worker's compensation, claiming it did not 
"arise out of and in the course of' his employment. The parties waived a formal hearing and 
submitted their Briefs based upon deposition testimony relative to the legal issues presented in the 
case, along with the written and video taped deposition of Mr. Tjas, so that the demeanor of the 
witness could be observed. In addition, the parties stipulated as to the facts of the case.4 Judge 
Elicerio entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on July 22,1998, granting Mr. 
Tjas' claim. A Motion for Review was filed and briefed by the parties and the Labor Commission 
issued its Order5 on February 26,1999, similarly finding that Mr. Tjas' was entitled to compensation 
because his activity in salting the driveway, under the particular circumstances of this case, was 
"reasonably incidental" to his employment and that his injuries arose "out of and in the course of his 
employment. Employers filed their Motion for Review with the Court of Appeals on March 15,1999, 
and their docketing statement on April 1,1999. Briefs were timely filed by Employers, with opposing 
Briefs filed separately by Mr. Tjas and the Labor Commission, with a Reply Brief by Employer. Oral 
argument was held on January 24, 2000. The Court's opinion was issued on February 10, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The determination of whether a particular activity is within the scope of employment is highly 
fact-dependent. "Indeed, our prior case law recognizes that 'whether or not the injury arises out of 
4See Order of Judge Elicerio, attached as Exhibit "A-3" to the Employers' Petition. 
5See Order Denying Motion for Review, attached as Exhibit "A-2" to Employers' Petition. 
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or within the scope of employment depends upon the particular facts of each case.'"6 The particular 
facts of this case, carefully reviewed by both the Commission and the Court of Appeals, as set forth 
in the Commission's Findings of Fact, included: 
"Mr. Tjas, a resident of Salt Lake City, was employed by Clevite as a district 
sales manager for Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana and parts of Nevada. Clevite did 
not maintain an office in Salt Lake City, but authorized Mr. Tjas to use his personal 
residence as a base of operations for his work. To that end, Clevite provided Mr. Tjas 
with a computer, printer, telephone line, telephone and answering machine for use in 
his home. Company correspondence, catalogues and price lists were delivered by 
U.S. mail or private courier services to Mr. Tjas's home, and Clevite provided Mr. 
Tjas with a car which was garaged there. Mr. Tjas generally made sales calls Monday 
through Thursday and performed office work at home on Friday. 
Access to Mr. Tjas's home and garage is by way of a steep driveway. In 
winter, the driveway is sometimes slick from snow or ice and, consequently, is 
hazardous to cars and pedestrians. It was Mr. Tjas's practice to remove the snow 
from the driveway, then spread salt on the driveway surface. 
The night before Mr. Tjas' accident, several inches of snow fell in Salt Lake 
City. The next morning, Monday, January 13, 1997, Mr. Tjas drove to several local 
sales calls, but did not first clear the snow from his sidewalk and driveway. Instead, 
Mr. Tjas's son cleared the snow while Mr. Tjas was making his sales calls. However, 
the driveway remained icy. 
After returning home in mid-afternoon, Mr. Tjas spent the next hour loading 
his car with material for an upcoming sales trip to Montana. He had been told by 
Clevite to expect delivery of a large package to be used in connection with the trip. 
Mr. Tjas did not know whether the package was to be delivered by U.S. mail or by 
a private carrier and he was not certain whether it would be delivered that day or the 
next. Nevertheless, when Mr. Tjas observed his mailman approaching he decided to 
spread salt on his driveway to enable the postman to safely negotiate the driveway and 
make his delivery to the Tjas residence. 
Mr. Tjas slipped and fell while spreading the salt, thereby suffering the injury 
for which he now seeks workers' compensation benefits."7 
6State Tax Common v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P. 2d 1051 , 1053 (Utah, 1984). 
1
 Supra, Note 5 at 3. 
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These facts are supported by the Record and not disputed by Employers.8 However, in Employers' 
Statement of Facts, they have selectively set forth additional facts upon which they rely, some of 
which are inaccurate or misleading, without marshaling the additional facts supporting that decision. 
For instance, Employers' assert that, "Mr. Tjas was aware that a city ordinance required all 
homeowners to clear snow and ice from their sidewalks and driveways"9 when Mr. Tjas' testimony 
only addressed the clearing of "snow" off the "sidewalks." Further, the ordinance requires only that 
snow be cleared from "sidewalks", without addressing either "ice" or "driveways". Employers' 
claims that in his application for long term disability, "Mr. Tjas specifically affirmed that his injury was 
not work-related and he did not intend to file a workers' compensation claim (R. 70),"10 is also 
misleading. Mr. Tjas testified that he did not, and could not, have signed any such document since 
he has been unable to use his arms or hands since his injury. Rather, that document would have been 
provided to his wife for her review and signature (R. 276, pp. 65-67). The Application for Hearing 
with the Utah Labor Commission was not filed until June 27, 1997, after Mrs. Tjas had an 
opportunity to review his rights with an attorney knowledgeable in the workers compensation field. 
Other facts which Employers failed to marshal in their Petition included: 
1. AE Clevite chose not to have Mr. Tjas work out of a company plant or building. Rather, 
he was required to travel from an office established at his home to his customers as part of his 
employment. In a normal week he traveled Monday through Thursday and then worked in his home 
office on Friday. (R. 276, p. 13) Mr. Tjas also did some work every day on his computer. (R. 276, 
8See Employers' Docketing Statement, paragraph 8 (b) which states, "This appeal concerns 
the Labor Commission's application of law to the particular facts of this case." 
9Supra, Note 1 at 7. 
10A/. atlO. 
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pp. 53, 61) He was required to work 40 or more hours per week. (R. 276, p. 19) He normally 
worked until 7:00 p.m. each day. (R. 276, p. 53) 
2. Mr. Tjas' only office address was 2467 Emerson, Salt Lake City, Utah, his home address. 
(R. 276, p. 52) His employer provided him with a company car which was to be kept at his home 
office. (R. 276, p. 18) His employer also provided him with a company computer and printer to be 
used at his home office and covered telephone expenses and other expenses involved with its 
operation. (R. 276, p. 61 and R. 275, p. 10) A separate company phone line and a separate company 
phone and answering machine were also maintained in conjunction with the office at Mr. Tjas' home. 
(R. 276, pp. 53, 54) The work area was spread out in the basement with big shelves with lots of 
company catalogs, price sheets and other information. (R. 276, p. 11) His work at the home office 
included preparation for sales calls and notes of items to be discussed with particular customers, 
reviewing which of the 200 price sheets and catalogues were needed, and loading those items into 
his company car. (R. 276, pp. 55-57) Company mail and materials were also regularly received at 
his home office. (R. 276, p. 49) 
3. Mr. Tjas was to leave on Wednesday, January 15, 1997, to Montana for an automotive 
engine parts show as part of his duties. He returned early from his sales calls at 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. on 
January 13, 1997, to prepare the appropriate catalogs and price sheets for the show and to wait for 
the company display for the show which he expected to arrive in the mail that day. (R. 276, p. 33) 
He began loading and organizing the trunk of his car with the appropriate catalogs and price sheets. 
(R. 276, p. 37) After loading the car and closing the trunk, Mr. Tjas went up the driveway to his 
home, still waiting for the arrival of the company display, and, almost immediately after that, saw the 
mailman coming up the street. (R. 276, p. 39) 
4. The mailman parked his truck across the street from Mr. Tjas' house and proceeded to 
-6-
deliver the mail up the far side of the street on the dead end circle and then turned back down Mr. 
Tjas' side of the street. (R. 276, p. 42) Although Mr. Tjas had no way to know for sure if the 
company display would arrive that day, or if it would be coming through the U.S. Mails or other 
courier service, he reasonably expected, based on conversations with the representative who was 
sending the package, that the package would arrive that day and knew it could be coming by U.S. 
Mail. (R. 276, pp. 50, 59, 60) The company display Mr. Tjas was expecting is about three feet long 
and one-half foot wide and is awkward and fairly heavy. (R. 276, pp. 50, 58) Mr. Tjas' mailbox is 
attached to his house next to his door. The postman would have to go up the driveway to get to the 
mailbox. (R. 276, pp. 28, 29) 
5. Mr. Tjas endeavored to keep his driveway salted, as well as shoveled, and his son generally 
shoveled it during the week and Mr. Tjas endeavored to salt it when he was around. However, he 
acknowledged, "It depended on the mood I was in and what happened that week. It wasn't a set 
thing, but I tried to do it." (R. 276, p. 59) 
6. Because of the awkward, heavy nature of the company display he was expecting, Mr. Tjas 
was particularly concerned that he needed to salt the driveway for the mailman. (R. 276, p. 58) He 
picked up a nearly empty 50 pound bag of salt, and began to salt his driveway when he saw the 
mailman coming. (R. 276, p. 39-40) The driveway did not appear to be slippery to him, although it 
had been windy and had left "a little skiff here and there" of snow. However, when Mr. Tjas reached 
the steep part of his driveway, he slipped and fell backwards, landing on his neck. (R. 276, p. 42) 
At the time of the fall, the mailman was close enough that he rushed to Mr. Tjas, then told Mrs. Tjas 
to call 911. (R. 276, p. 42, 43) Mr. Tjas has since been diagnosed with C3-4 Quadriplegia. 
7. The company display did not arrive on January 13, 1997 as expected. Rather it arrived 
the next day. (R. 276, p. 64) 
-7-
Based on the totality of the facts in this case, the Commission properly determined that Mr. 
Tjas' activity when he "spread salt on his driveway to enable the postman to safely negotiate the 
driveway and make his delivery to the Tjas residence," was "reasonably incidental" to his 
employment, where Mr. Tjas needed that anticipated delivery for a forthcoming business trip. Those 
facts reflected that his activity was reasonably intended to advance, directly or indirectly, his 
employer's interests so as to constitute an activity arising "out of and in the course o f employment. 
That "causal relationship"at the time of the injury was sufficient support for the award. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT ANY IMPORTANT ISSUE OF STATE 
LAW THAT HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT. 
The sole issue presented to the Court of Appeals for review was whether the Labor 
Commission abused its discretion by determining that Mr. Tjas' slip and fall accident on January 13, 
1997, was an accident which "arose out of and in the course o f his employment, where it occurred 
while he was salting his icy driveway in an effort to ensure that an approaching postman would be 
able to safely negotiate his driveway to make delivery of large and awkward business package, which 
Mr. Tjas reasonably believed might be delivered that day, and which he required before he could leave 
on a forthcoming sales trip. 
The standard of review on such matters is clearly established. "The commission has the duty 
and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter 
or any other title or chapter it administers."1 ] The Commission's discretion in regard to such Orders 
is extremely broad, its Findings and Conclusions are entitled to great deference, and its Conclusions 
llUtah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997). 
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are reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard, in which the Court determines whether the 
Order exceeds "the bounds of reasonableness and rationality."12 In this case, no showing of any such 
"abuse of discretion" was made. When all of the facts of the case are reviewed, there is a sufficient 
factual basis upon which the Commission could have found that Mr. Tjas' activities were reasonably 
"incidental to" his employment, at the time of the injury. Mr. Tjas' activity was motivated by a 
substantial business purpose when he was salting his driveway. He was expecting delivery that day 
of a large, bulky and awkward business package to his residence, which he required for forthcoming 
business trip and which he reasonably believed the postman might be delivering that day. When he 
saw the postman coming, Mr. Tjas became concerned that the postman might not be able to get up 
the icy driveway with that awkward package and, to ensure that the delivery could be made, he began 
salting the driveway, at which time he slipped, fell and was severely injured. 
Employers now seek to have this Court engraft an exception to Utah's determinative statute, 
so that it would provide coverage "wherever such injury occurred," unless such an injury occurred 
at a home. Such an exception has never been the law in this state or in any other state, and there 
appears no reason why this Court should consider establishing any such exception. 
Employers assert that this is a case of "first impression" but, due to the particular nature of 
worker's compensation law, most such cases are "cases of first impression." The Commission's 
statutory duties entail looking at each of those cases, and their unique underlying facts, to determine 
whether the injuries are compensable in line with the determinative statutory provisions and guidelines 
established by existing case law, "wherever such injury occurred." The Commission and the Court 
properly applied those provisions and guidelines under Utah law to Mr. Tjas' "work-at-home" 
situation, the same as they would have been applied to an injury occurring at any other location. 
]2Osman Home Imp, v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 P. 2d 240, 242 (Ut. App., 1998). 
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Employers' "Questions Presented for Review" fail to set forth any questions involving any 
"special" or "important" reasons why the Petition should be granted, as reflected in Rule 46, Utah 
R. App. P. The decision is neither in conflict with any decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals nor with any decision of this Court. The decision neither departs, nor sanctions any 
departure, from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. The decision does not involve 
any issue of state law which has not been settled by this Court. Neither does the Petition set forth 
any other "special and important reason" appear why this Court should grant that Petition. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION PROPERLY RECOGNIZES THAT 
AN EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES 
RECEIVED WHICH ARE "REASONABLY INCIDENTAL" TO HIS 
EMPLOYMENT AND DID NOT SANCTION ANY "UNREASONABLY 
BROAD" APPLICATION OF UTAH'S WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT. 
The Court of Appeals properly recognized, as the Commission had previously, that Mr. Tjas' 
injuries arose "out of and within the course o f his employment. The employer had an arrangement 
with Mr. Tjas to maintain the company office at his home, fully supplied by the employer, and where 
he maintained substantial shelves of work-related materials and regularly engaged in work for his 
employer. Company mail, catalogues and price lists were maintained at his home and were regularly 
forwarded to Mr. Tjas by U.S. Mail or courier. Given those circumstances, combined with Mr. Tjas' 
endeavors to secure the business package he required from the postman, it was properly determined 
that Mr. Tjas' injuries at home were "reasonably incidental" to his employment. The Court also 
properly recognized that "reasonably incidental," as used by the Commission, was not synonymous 
with "relatively insignificant" or "tangentially related," as argued by Employers. Rather, it referred 
to an activity which, while not actually part of the employee's regular duties, was nevertheless of 
some benefit or advantage to the employer or advanced the employers' interests, so as to constitute 
an injury "arising out of and in the course o f employment. As the Court explained: 
-10-
"In other words, Mr. Tjas's act of salting the driveway was motivated in-part by a 
purpose to benefit Ae Clevite and thus was reasonably incidental, rather than 
tangentially related, to his employment. As such, the Commission correctly concluded 
that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose 'in the course of his employment".13 
Utah Courts have awarded compensation in a number of cases in which the activities in which 
the employee was involved at the time of the injury were reasonably "incidental" to the employment, 
as that term was used by the Commission and the Court in Mr. Tjas' case. The determination of 
whether such an activity is "incidental to" the employment is determined under the particular facts 
of each case, regardless of the type of activity involved or "wherever such injury occurred."14 
Employers' now claim, for the first time in this Writ, that Mr. Tjas' claim is based on his 
mental intent at the time and declare that "Mental intent has never been, nor should it be, a sufficient 
basis for awarding workers compensation benefits."1- Contrary to that broad declaration, Utah case 
law is replete with awards of compensation based upon an employees' intent to engage in an act for 
the benefit of his employer or an act otherwise "incidental to" his or her employment. 
In Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial Comm'nJ6 this Court upheld compensation for an 
employee killed while returning home after an evening at the governor's ball with his employer. The 
Court based its decision on the mental intent of the employee, explaining that the award was 
appropriate where the employee had believed the governor's ball event would present an opportunity 
to discuss some business issues with his employer, even though no business was discussed that 
evening, and although the employer had considered the evening solely as a social affair. 
A few of the other cases where the award was based on the employee's mental intent include: 
uSupra, Note 3. 
,4Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1997). 
15Employers' Petition, Page 15. 
16663 P. 2d 88 (Utah, 1983). 
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Kahn Brothers v. Industrial Comm'nJ7 where the employee's mental intent was to drive to the post 
office to pick up his employer's mail; Kinne v. Industrial Comm'nJl where the employee's mental 
intent was to drive to a specified location to pick up a trailer; and Bailey v. Industrial Comm'n..19 
where the employee's mental intent was to take his station wagon to work because it was regularly 
used at work for emergency calls or temporary use of customers. In each of those cases, the alleged 
mental intent of the employee, supported by the surrounding facts, was the basis for the recovery 
since intervening accidents precluded the employees from engaging in the anticipated activities on 
behalf of the employer. None of those cases rested upon questions of whether there was actually any 
mail waiting at the post office, any trailer waiting to be picked up, or any customer who sought use 
of the station wagon at work on that particular day. What may have actually existed in hindsight did 
not matter, so long as the employee had the mental intent of serving the employer's interests. 
In fact, if mental intent were not a sufficient bases for an award, the entire line of "dual 
purpose" cases could not exist. Yet that significant exception to the "going and coming" rule has 
been clearly established under Utah law and allows compensation where an employee is engaged in 
an activity in which there is some real or substantial benefit intended for the employer, even though 
he may also have a substantial personal purpose for engaging in that activity, so long as the 
employment-related purpose is not merely a minor factor or afterthought20. Whitehead 21 does not 
support any contrary determination since it merely involved an employee who was driving home for 
1775 Utah 145, 283 P. 1054 (1929). 
18609 P. 2d 926 (Utah, 1980). 
,916 Utah 2d 208, 398 P. 2d 545 (Utah, 1965). 
20Supra, Note 16. See also Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P. 2d 1037 (Utah, 1991). 
21Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life, 801 P. 2d 934 (Utah, 1989). 
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supper when the injury occurred and his claim that he intended to make some calls after supper was 
found to be immaterial since there was no indication that those calls could not have been made from 
a location other than the home. Martinson22 similarly reflects no contrary determination. It simply 
involved an adverse credibility determination in which the Commission rejected the employee's 
assertions regarding his mental intent, in view of the totality of the facts. 
The guidelines applied by the Commission and the Court of Appeals to Mr. Tjas' award, 
contrary to Employers' assertions, were simply the same standard guidelines which have regularly 
been applied in prior Utah workers compensation cases. The Court of Appeals' decision does not 
herald "broad and sweeping" changes to the Utah compensation laws. The Court merely chose to 
reject Employers' demands for a "broad and sweeping" change to exclude only work-at-home injuries 
from the determinative statutes and existing Utah workers' compensation case law. The Court's 
decision was short and to the point because there was nothing so unique or unusual in this case as not 
to be adequately governed by existing Utah law. 
Given the fact that Mr. Tjas reasonably believed that the work-related package he was 
expecting might be delivered by the postman that day, he had a clear work-related reason for salting 
the driveway in the manner and at the time he did, resulting in his injury. The fact that Mr. Tjas 
might have undertaken to salt the driveway at other various times for his own purposes does not 
mean that he could not have been doing so at the time of his injury for business purposes. Awards of 
compensation have been entered in numerous circumstances for injuries to employees which were 
suffered while crossing a street or driving home which, at the time of the injury, was for business 
purposes. The approach of Employers in this case would have denied compensation in all such cases, 
since those employees had obviously crossed the street or driven home at other times when it 
22Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency. Inc.. 606 P. 2d 256 (Utah, 1980) 
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involved only personal activities. The question which the Commission was required to resolve in this 
case, as with other such cases, was whether at the particular time of the injury, the activity of the 
Employee was motivated by some business purpose. In Mr. Tjas' case, the Commission concluded: 
"In light of the foregoing, under the specific facts of this case, Mr. Tjas's efforts to 
make his driveway safe for the delivery of mail was reasonably incidental to the 
performance of Clevite's work. Consequently, the injuries Mr. Tjas suffered while 
salting his driveway arise i n the course' of his employment for Clevite." 23 
In rendering their decisions, the Commission and the Court of Appeals properly relied upon 
the basic standards which have previously been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court with regard to 
workers compensation awards in general. As they recognized, this Court in Buczynski v. Industrial 
Common,24 before entering into any discussions concerning the effect and application of the 
"continuous coverage" rule in Utah, addressed "Compensability in General," explaining as follows: 
"Under Utah law, an accident occurs 'in the course' of employment when it 'occurs 
while the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do or 
doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was 
authorized to render such service.'" M & K Corp., v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah 
488, 493, 189 P. 2d 132, 134 (1948) (emphasis added). 
An accident arises out of employment 'when there is a 'causal relationship' between 
the injury and the employment' Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Comm'n, 888 P. 2d 
707, 712 (Utah Ct. App., 1994) (Quoting M & K Corp. 112 Utah at 493, 189 P. 2d 
at 134) cert, denied 899 P. 2d 1231 (Utah, 1995). "'Arising out of,' however, does not 
mean that the accident must be 'caused by' the employment; rather, the employment 
'is thought of more as a condition out of which the event arises than as the force 
producing the event in affirmative fashion.'" Commercial Carriers, 888 P. 2d at 712 
(quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §6.60, at 3-9 
(1994) (emphasis in quoted treatise)."25 
Those statements by this Court were not limited to "continuous coverage" cases. Further, they 
sSupra, Note 5 at 4. 
9^34 P. 2d 1169 (Utah App., 1997). 
'Id. at 1172. 
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accurately summarized the prior cases referenced therein which, similarly, were not "continuous 
coverage" cases. That quotation properly reflects the state of Utah's law with regard to 
"Compensability in General" and the reliance of the Commission and the Court of Appeals upon that 
quotation was not misplaced. 
Neither the Commission nor the Utah Court of Appeals have determined in this case that an 
activity which is "merely incidental" to employment is sufficient to justify an award of compensation, 
to the extent that term is used synonymously with "minimal", "relatively insignificant" or only 
"tangentially related to" the employment. Rather, they both acknowledged that injuries which are 
only "tangentially related to work" are not compensable. They further recognized, however, that 
there is a significant difference between an activity in such a minimal category as opposed to an 
activity which is "incidental to" or "reasonably incidental to" the employment, as in M & KCorp. 
v. Industrial Comm'n.26 In short, "An injury occurs in the 'course of employment' when it takes 
place, 'while she is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doings something incidental thereto.'"27 
Similar usages of the term "incidental to" employment may be found in Black v. McDonalds28; 
Hafer's Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n29; Birkner v. Industrial Comm'n30; Christensen v. Swenson3I; and 
Christensen v. Swenson.32 
26112 Utah 488, 493, 189 P. 2d 132, 134 (1948). 
27Walls v. Industrial Comm'n. 857 P. 2d 964, 967 (Utah App., 1993). 
28733P. 2d 154, 156 (Utah, 1987) 
29526 P. 2d 1188, 1189 (Utah, 1974). 
30771 P. 2d 1053, 1056 (Utah, 1989). 
31844 P. 2d 992, rev'd 874 P. 2d 125, 127 (Utah, 1994). 
32Christensen v. Swenson. 844 P. 2d at 994. 
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What this language truly reflects, in the manner utilized by the Utah Courts, is that there needs 
to be a "causal relationship" between the relationship and the employment, i.e. an intended benefit 
to the employer33. The particular facts of Mr. Tjas' case, demonstrated that there was such a 
reasonable "causal connection" between Mr. Tjas activity at the time of his injur/ and his 
employment, and not merely some "tangential" relationship. 
In view of the guidelines previously established under Utah law, which are equally applicable 
to the injuries suffered by Mr. Tjas, there is little reason for this Court to examine the case law of 
other jurisdictions. However, other jurisdictions have similarly granted compensation to workers 
injured at home where those injuries were "reasonably incidental," as opposed to merely "tangential" 
to their employment, following the same guidelines as those previously discussed herein. Thus, while 
compensation may have been denied for an employee who fell down the stairs at home while carrying 
a book from work34, compensation was awarded for another employee who took books and files 
home to prepare for a client interview the next day and was injured coming down the stairs at home 
while carrying the books because they slipped and she lost her balance and fell grabbing for them35. 
While compensation was denied for an employee who was at home on call and fell off a ladder trying 
to answer a phone call (based on the Court's declaration that there was no showing it was the 
employer who was calling)36 compensation was granted for another employee on call who was 
carrying decorations down her stairs at home and was injured trying to answer a phone call (based 
on the Court's declaration that it was not reasonable to expect an employee to know if it was the 
33Askren v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 275, 276, 391 P. 2d 302, 303 (Utah, 1964). 
34Glasser v. Youth Shop, Inc., 54 So. 2d 686 (Fla., 1951). 
35Moore v. Family Service of Charleston, 237 S.E. 2d 84 (So. Carol., 1977). 
36Lovd v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, 280 S.W. 2d 955 (Tex. App., 1955) 
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employer calling without first answering the phone37. While compensation may have been denied for 
an employee who suffered a heart attack in the morning attempting to get the family truck freed from 
a snowbank so he could get the family car into the garage to load his suitcase for a business trip he 
was to take on an airplane trip late that afternoon (an activity which the court determined was simply 
too far distant from that special mission to be reasonably causally related to the employment),38 
compensation was granted for another employee who suffered a heart attack, during a blizzard, while 
attempting to shovel the deep snow out of the driveway so he could get to work for an important 
meeting, as requested by his vice-president.39 While compensation may have been denied for an 
employee injured going out the door of his home to drive his truck to work, despite the fact that he 
had the truck at home for possible 24 hour deliveries (the Court declaring that he would have had to 
drive to work regardless)40 compensation was granted for an employee who was injured while going 
from his house to his truck with the intent of making deliveries.41 In fact, Utah law would likely have 
awarded compensation under the facts of either of these latter two cases.42 
Other cases relied upon by Employers have followed the same guidelines as would have been 
applied under existing Utah law. Under the particular fact situations of those cases, as opposed to 
the facts in this case, the activities in which the employees were engaged at the time of their injuries 
were not reasonably incidental to their employment, so compensation was denied for: a laid-off 
37American Red Cross v. Wilson, 519 S. W. 2d 60 (Ark., 1975) 
380wen v. Chrysler Corporation, 371 N.W. 2d 519 (Mich. App., 1985). 
39Junium v. A.L. Bazzini Company, Inc, 446 N.Y.S. 2d 520 (N.Y., 1982). 
40Russellville Gas Co. v. Duggar, 260 So. 2d 393 cert, den. 260 So. 2d 395 (Ala., 1971). 
41Black River Dairy Prod., Inc., v. Dept. of Ind., Labor & Human Relations, 207 N.W. 2d 65 
(Wis., 1973). 
42Moser v. Industrial Common, 21 Utah 2d 51, 440 P. 2d 23 (1968). 
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employee who had a heart attack at home following a conversation with his former employer (and 
who the commission found was performing absolutely no service for the employer whatsoever at the 
time of his injury)43; a motel manager injured in a fall on her day off on a walkway outside her 
apartment door, while leaving to go shopping for groceries44; an employee who was told to dispose 
of some plants at her workplace, and who decided to dispose of them by taking them home and was 
injured while standing on a chair, trying to hang those plants at her home (an activity which the court 
found was so far removed from mere disposition of the plants as to be "not for the benefit of her 
employer to any appreciable extent'')45; an employee injured while blowing leaves from his driveway 
with an electrical device he brought from work and modified for his own use (where the claim that 
he was "testing" the device for his employer was rejected by the Commission due to the surrounding 
facts)46; a custodian of a church who was injured while going down the steps of his home, and which 
was provided by his employer, to select a place to store his old refrigerator (an act which the court 
specifically found to be a purely personal purpose and "not incidental to his employment").47 
On the other hand, where cases from other jurisdictions have involved facts reflecting that the 
employee was engaged in an activity which was reasonably incidental to the employment at the time 
of the injury, compensation has been granted for: an employee injured in a fall off a ladder while 
painting a home, which was also regularly used as the company's office;48 a pizza salesman who 
43Ralph's Grocery Co. v. W.C.A.B., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161 (Cal. App., 1997). 
44
 Roberts v. Stell 367 N. W. 2d 198 (S.D., 1985). 
45Fortner v. J.K. Holding Co., 349 S.E. 2d 296, 298 (N.C. Ct. App., 1986). 
46Quaglino v. Ace Bakery Division of Lakeland Bakers, Inc., 275 So. 2d 874 (La. App., 
1973). 
47Fingers v. Mt. Tabor United Church of Christ. 439 S.W. 2d 241 (Mo., 1969) 
48Brogger v. Kezer, 626 P. 2d 700 (Colo. App., 1980). 
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regularly worked out of his home and who was injured when he slipped and fell as he was walking 
from his home to his truck49; a registered nurse who was injured when she slipped and fell on ice in 
her own walkway as she was returning home from a client visit, where she regularly worked out of 
her home50; a news reporter injured while traveling between home, where preparatory work was 
regularly required to be performed, and the station51; an employee injured during travel from home 
to another work site where the regularity and quantity of the work at home had made it part of the 
work premises52; an employee injured while shoveling snow to remove an obstacle to exiting his home 
to visit customers53; an off duty employee injured when he stepped on a rake while walking to his car 
at home in order to respond to a report of a broken telephone pole 54; a nurse injured when she 
slipped on wet grass while walking to her car from a residential facility preparatory to travel to her 
next client;55 and even a bookkeeper who regularly performed her duties in her own home on her 
couch before going to bed each night and who was injured when she attempted to move a shotgun, 
which someone had left on that couch earlier in the day, so that she could perform her work.56 
CONCLUSION 
Employers have failed to establish any reason why this Court should exercise its discretion 
49Supra,Note4l. 
50Jones v. W.C.A.B.. 489 A. 2d 1006 (Pa. Comm., 1985). 
5{Wilson v. Service Broadcasters. 483 So. 2d 1339 (Miss., 1986) 
52Kavcee Coal Co. v. Short. 450 S.W. 2d 262, 265 (Ct. App., Ky, 1970). 
53Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 630 A. 2d 136 aff d 642 A. 2d 721 (Conn., 1994). 
54Hughes v. New York Telephone Co.. 472 N.Y.S. 2d 513 (N.Y., 1984). 
55Hollman v. Comfort Care. Inc., 1999 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 58 (Okla. App., 1999) 
56Joe Ready's Shell Station and Cafe v. Ready. 65 So. 2d 268, 270 (Miss., 1953). 
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to accept Employers' Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this case, within the guidelines established 
under Rule 46, Utah R. App. P. and the same should be rejected. The particular facts of this case 
clearly support the Commission's award to Mr. Tjas since he was, indeed, salting the driveway at the 
time of his injury for the specific purpose of allowing the postman to safely negotiate the driveway 
and make his delivery of the expected large, bulky and awkward business package to the Tjas 
residence, which Mr. Tjas reasonably believed the postman may be delivering that day. The 
Commission's decision, therefore, cannot be said to have exceeded "the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality." 
Employers have failed to reflect any reason why this Court should consider engrafting an 
exception to existing Utah law. The exception they seek would bar compensation for an injury, solely 
because it occurred at a home, despite the fact that the employee was engaged in an activity which 
was reasonably incidental to the employment at the time of the injury and, therefore, the injury "arose 
out of and in the course of the employment." Such an exception has never been the law of this State 
nor of any other state, and establishment of such an exception would, indeed, constitute a "broad and 
sweeping" change to our existing worker's compensation system. 
Respectfully submitted this ^s day of March, 2000. 




I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on the^L day of March, 2000, two true and correct copies of 
the BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, CHARLES TJAS (EMPLOYEE) IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, were duly deposited with the United States mails, first 
class postage prepaid, and duly addressed for delivery to each of the following: 
Alan L. Hennebold, General Counsel 
Labor Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O.Box 146610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610 
Michael E. Dyer 
Dori K. Petersen 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
AE Clevite, Inc. and/or 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1609 
-21-
